Why this verdict
- suspicious: finding skill:skills/scanning-iac-and-images-with-trivy:skills/scanning-iac-and-images-with-trivy/SKILL.md:216:SUPPLY
- suspicious: finding skill:skills/scanning-iac-and-images-with-trivy:skills/scanning-iac-and-images-with-trivy/SKILL.md:67:EXEC
- suspicious: finding skill:skills/scanning-iac-and-images-with-trivy:skills/scanning-iac-and-images-with-trivy/SKILL.md:70:SUPPLY
- suspicious: floor fact PY-FETCH-EXEC-INSTRUCTED (DET:5069564061036731)
- suspicious: floor fact PY-FETCH-EXEC-INSTRUCTED (DET:53c06dc76a561fcb)
- suspicious: floor fact PY-FETCH-EXEC-INSTRUCTED (DET:93904a0c83928a5f)
Security findings 3
Code execution
criticalContextual riskhigh confidenceThe Prerequisites section instructs the agent to pipe the unpinned main-branch contrib/install.sh from raw.githubusercontent.com into sudo sh, executing mutable remote code with root privileges whose behavior lives outside the pinned commit.
curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/trivy/main/contrib/install.sh | sudo sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
conceal:remotevector:instruction
Counter-argument considered
contrib/install.sh is the vendor's (Aqua Security's) official installer invoked by its documented curl|sh method inside a fenced code block of the Prerequisites installation docs; the vendor-installers-in-fenced-install-docs carve-out carries no pinning condition, so the harm gate fails even though the raw.githubusercontent.com fetch is undeclared residue.
Supply chain
highContextual risklow confidenceThe CI/CD gate examples pin the official Trivy GitHub Action to the mutable @master ref instead of a version or commit SHA, so the action code executed in the pipeline can change without notice.
uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
conceal:remotevector:instruction
Counter-argument considered
The kill case fails: the 'pinned official-registry installs' carve-out requires a pin, @master is mutable, the CI-gate wiring is only the declared capability while the unpinned ref is the harm, and no shown claim or mitigation covers the ref. The accurate supply-chain finding stands.
Supply chain
mediumContextual risklow confidenceThe containerized usage example runs the unpinned latest tag of the aquasec/trivy image with the host Docker socket mounted, tying scan execution to mutable remote code with daemon-level access.
docker run --rm -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock aquasec/trivy:latest image python:3.10-alpine
vector:instruction
Counter-argument considered
The kill case fails: the official-registry carve-out requires pinning and :latest is unpinned, a container run is runtime execution rather than a vendor installer in install docs, and no shown claim or mitigation covers the mutable tag, so the accurate supply finding stands.
Open questions 1
What the analysis could not settle from the code alone.
The install script executed as root via `curl ... | sudo sh` is served from the mutable URL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/trivy/main/contrib/install.sh and is not part of the pinned commit; its runtime content cannot be verified from the artifact.
Code execution
Refuted findings 2
Candidates the review stage examined and rejected, kept for transparency.
Persistence
criticalRefutedmedium confidenceSKILL.md instructs the agent to install a GPG key into /usr/share/keyrings and write a permanent APT repository entry via `sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/trivy.list`, persistently modifying the host package-manager configuration outside the workspace.
sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/trivy.list
Why it was refuted
The APT keyring and sources.list.d setup is Aqua Security's official vendor install procedure, openly labeled and fenced inside the Prerequisites installation docs, which matches the vendor-installers-in-fenced-install-docs carve-out (and serves the declared core capability), so the harm gate fails and the persistence framing does not survive.
Privilege escalation
highRefutedlow confidenceSKILL.md instructs the agent to run the unpinned aquasec/trivy:latest container with the host /var/run/docker.sock mounted in, granting that container root-equivalent control of the host Docker daemon.
docker run --rm -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock aquasec/trivy:latest image python:3.10-alpine
Why it was refuted
The socket mount is the vendor-documented mechanism for the declared core capability of scanning container images via containerized Trivy, declared in the artifact itself ('Docker (optional) if scanning local images by name or using the containerized Trivy.'), so the privilege grant is the declared core capability plus a broad permission inherent to it, and the PRIVESC claim is carved out at the harm gate.