Announcing Beacon: Self-improving memory for coding agents
← All skills
Skill

performing-firmware-malware-analysis

skill:mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills#performing-firmware-malware-analysis

Analyzes firmware images for embedded malware, backdoors, and unauthorized modifications in routers, IoT devices, UEFI/BIOS, and embedded systems, covering firmware extraction, filesystem analysis, binary reverse engineering, and bootkit detection. Use for firmware security analysis, IoT malware investigation, UEFI rootkit detection, or embedded device compromise assessment.

Verdict
Suspicious

Risky behavior the analysis could not rule out.

Analyzed Oct 27, 2026, 22:27 UTC at 54a7988

Dispute security verdict

If you believe this verdict is incorrect, submit a dispute and we'll review it.

1
findings
medium
highest severity
1
threat classes
4,532
files scanned
68/68
checks satisfied
0
package advisories

Why this verdict

  • suspicious: finding skill:skills/performing-firmware-malware-analysis:skills/performing-firmware-malware-analysis/SKILL.md:48:SUPPLY

Security findings 1

Supply chain

mediumContextual risklow confidence

The skill instructs the agent to install binwalk from PyPI without a version pin as a prerequisite, leaving the core analysis toolchain unpinned and mutable at fetch time.

`pip install binwalk`
vector:instruction
Counter-argument considered

The quote is accurate: a bare, unpinned install of the core analysis toolchain with no version specifier or hash, which is not covered by the pinned-official-registry carve-out and has no mitigating pin elsewhere in the shown units; the command being openly declared in Prerequisites does not neutralize the fetch-time mutability risk.

Refuted findings 1

Candidates the review stage examined and rejected, kept for transparency.

Privilege escalation

highRefutedlow confidence

The skill instructs the agent to use sudo mount, sudo cp, and sudo chroot to execute the extracted firmware's shell with root privileges on the host for dynamic analysis, so analyzed malware running in the chroot could compromise the host if it escapes emulation.

sudo chroot /mnt/firmware /bin/sh
Why it was refuted

The sudo mount/cp/chroot commands are the openly documented, standard technique for the skill's declared core capability of dynamic firmware emulation (declared in Prerequisites and in Step 5), not an undeclared privilege-escalation attack; the host-compromise scenario is an inherent risk of legitimately running extracted firmware, not behavior the artifact directs or conceals.