What the analysis could not settle from the code alone.
The declared description says the skill wraps safari-mcp for Safari, but every shipped backend document in this pass describes DOMShell (a Chrome accessibility-tree MCP server via npx); which server the Safari skill actually drives is not shown in the provided units.
Detector-quoted claims ('No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' and 'No external dependencies.') used as the premise of several PY-CLAIM-CONTRADICTION leads do not appear in the cited units, so those leads were not confirmed; whether such claims exist elsewhere in the artifact is unresolved.
Detector leads quote a 'No external dependencies.' claim in SKILL.md allegedly contradicted by external GitHub URLs, but that claim text does not appear in any shown unit; the location and existence of the claim is unsettled.
All PY-CLAIM-CONTRADICTION leads cite a claim text ('Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM') that is absent from the cited units' shown content, so none of those leads could be confirmed as findings.
The analyzed target is skills/cli-anything-safari, but every shown unit comes from cli-anything-plugin and cli-hub-matrix; whether the Safari skill actually loads these shared guides at runtime is unsettled.
The owed units belong to cli-hub-matrix/video-creation references and the cli-hub package, while the declared target is the skills/cli-anything-safari skill; the shown evidence does not establish whether the Safari skill ever loads any of this content.
What instructions the remote heygen-com/hyperframes skill (installed via the npx command in captions.md) actually contains is not present in this repository and cannot be judged from the shown evidence.
Supply chain
The PY-CLAIM-CONTRADICTION detector leads on the doctor-review and render-doctor units cite a claim string ('- Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM') that does not appear in the cited unit text, and the cited file writes are plain report/frame redirects of the declared doctor workflow; the leads appear to be detector noise, but the triggering detector logic could not be inspected.
Persistence
Detector lead DET:03c98539914e3b3b (PY-CLAIM-CONTRADICTION, class PERSIST) cites freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/freecad_cli.py lines 2199-2200 with excerpt 'export_mod.export_project(proj, output_path, preset=preset, overwrite=overwrite)' and a contradicted docstring claim; none of that text is visible in this pass's decoded docstring view of freecad_cli.py, so the hit could not be verified.
Persistence
The batch target is skill 'skills/cli-anything-safari' declared as Safari browser automation via safari-mcp with 84 MCP tools, but every served unit belongs to the FreeCAD CLI harness or the Openscreen video editor; the Safari skill's own instruction surface (SKILL.md frontmatter/body, MCP metadata) was not shown, so it remains unjudged and the content/target mismatch is unsettled.
Detector lead DET:6a92cabf729f6a3d cites the claim 'No external dependencies.' at HARNESS.md line 161, but no shown unit of HARNESS.md contains that claim (line 161 area holds the example URL https://example.com); confirm whether the file makes this claim anywhere, since it would contradict the documented per-call npx network fetch.
Detector leads DET:d715abfc6edf862c, DET:a024fef1fae0bb1f, DET:70d3a4770ccdce65 and DET:3e6eb3489a55ada7 cite the claim '- Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM' against CLI usage sections of the openscreen and renderdoc SKILL.md files where that text does not appear; the cited excerpts ([-t, -o, 100, --format) are ordinary CLI flags, so these leads appear to be false positives.
Detector leads repeatedly cite the claims 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' and 'No external dependencies.' being contradicted by exec, network, and file-write behavior across harness code; which artifact text makes these claims, and does the cli-anything-safari skill body repeat them? This belongs to declared-vs-actual and cannot be settled without the claim-bearing text.
Contradiction C432/C433 not confirmed: the cited subprocess.Popen calls live in blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/blender_cli.py (spawning the local 'cli-hub previews watch' viewer and the CLI's own poller), while claims D248 ('No Safari, no network, no subprocess.') and D284 are homed in safari/agent-harness documents; whether those safari-scoped claims govern Blender component code cannot be settled from this batch.
Code execution
Contradiction C1/C2 not confirmed: the cited writes (open(log_path, 'ab') for poller.log and scene_mod.save_scene for 'scene new --output') are the Blender CLI's own declared save/log features and do not on their face contradict the listed file_write claims (D16 page-update stability note, D89/D99/D123/D124 read-only cli-hub previews consumer, D195/D201/D205 caption-doctor documentation rules), which are homed in browser/, cli-anything-plugin/ and cli-hub-matrix/ documents; confirming requires t⟦… 20 more chars …⟧
Persistence
Residues R48–R52 flag env '*' at SKILL.md lines 80/93/108/119/131, but the cited units contain only scene-object subcommand tables where `set` sets object, material, modifier, camera, or light properties (e.g., 'Set an object property (name, visible, location, rotation, scale, parent)'); confirm whether any actual environment-variable access exists behind these rows or the leads are detector false positives on the subcommand name 'set'.
Credential access
Contradictions C3–C16 pair file writes in the Blender harness (preview.py, render.py, scene.py, session.py) with read-only/doc-writing claims from other harnesses (browser HARNESS.md, cli-anything-plugin, cli-hub-matrix); the writes verified here are producer-side app state (session.json, manifests, _render_script.py, scene saves) and the read-only paths (live_status, latest) were confirmed not to write, so the pairings appear spurious — confirm no claim in the other files is actually broken by ⟦… 13 more chars …⟧
The target is declared as 'cli-anything-safari' (Safari browser automation via safari-mcp), but all 49 units in this batch belong to a Blender scene CLI skill (blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender) with its own SKILL.md and test suite; whether shipping this Blender skill under a Safari-declared target constitutes undeclared functionality is not settleable from the evidence shown. Note: the listed PY-CLAIM-CONTRADICTION leads (C287-C42) were verified and adjudicated as false positives: the ⟦… 441 more chars …⟧
Supply chain
The scope of safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md:238 claim D248 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' is not shown; the blender subprocess and compile() capabilities (C434-C457) contradict it only if that safari-harness claim governs the blender component shipped in the same repository, so contradictions C434-C454 are adjudicated as non-contradictions against D284 (blender tests never invoke the safari CLI or safari-mcp) but left undetermined against D248.
Code execution
Whether scene JSON string fields (object/material/camera/light names, hdri_path) are escaped anywhere before f-string interpolation into generated bpy scripts; the shown generators interpolate them raw into single-quoted Python string literals (e.g. obj.name = '{name}', bpy.data.materials.new(name='{name}')), so a crafted scene JSON could inject statements that render_script then executes via blender --background --python, though impact is confined to locally rendering the user's own scene.
Code execution
The units in this batch are the generic cli-anything-plugin methodology documents (building CLIs for LibreOffice/Blender/GIMP/Shotcut etc. with apt installs, subprocess rendering, and npx MCP backends), while the reviewed target is the cli-anything-safari skill declared to wrap only the safari-mcp server; whether and how this generic GUI-harness surface is wired into the Safari skill cannot be determined from the units shown.
Contradictions C491-C497: do D248 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md:238) and D284 (safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/README.md:153) describe cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/scripts/video_doctor.py, or only the Safari CLI? The script's subprocess ffmpeg/ffprobe executions (C491-C494, C495-C497) only genuinely break those claims if they are in scope; C54/C55 were adjudicated as not genuine because the read-only/'doctor passed' claims concern the separate⟦… 93 more chars …⟧
Code execution
Is cli-hub-matrix/video-creation (including video_doctor.py) part of the cli-anything-safari skill target's shipped surface? If yes, its video-diagnostics exec capability is undeclared by the Safari-automation description; if it is a separate repository component, it is declared there by the video-creation references (D209/D210).
Code execution
Whether the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md:238) is scoped to a specific subcomponent or to the whole cli-hub tooling; this decides whether the installer subprocess calls (C500-C511) and the matrix registry network fetch (C394) are true contradictions versus mechanically paired, out-of-scope claims.
Code execution
Whether 'No external dependencies.' (cli-anything-plugin/HARNESS.md:147) covers the cli-hub package's runtime requests/network usage or only SKILL.md content and unit tests, as the sibling claims D71/D78/D112/D133 suggest.
Supply chain
Does the safety claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (D247/D248, safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md) scope over cli-hub's preview/registry tooling (preview.py subprocess browser launch, registry.py network fetch) or only over the Safari harness's own build/docs components — this decides whether contradiction C513 (and part of C398) is genuine.
Code execution
Does 'No external dependencies.' (D61, cli-anything-plugin/HARNESS.md) describe cli-hub runtime behavior (which performs requests-based registry fetches to hkuds.github.io and caches to ~/.cli-hub) or only the plugin's packaging/docs, deciding whether C397/C398 is a genuine contradiction.
Supply chain
The safety claims D61 'No external dependencies.', D247/D248 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.', and the read-only previews claims D89/D99/D123/D124 have their home units outside this batch, so their scope (own-harness unit tests and docs vs. the whole repository) cannot be verified; this determines whether the cli-hub installer network/exec strings and the tmp_path test-fixture writes genuinely contradict them — verified in this batch, the tests mock subprocess/network so no capability con⟦… 175 more chars …⟧
The target is declared as a Safari browser automation skill (safari-mcp), but this batch consists of a multi-application preview protocol document (Shotcut, Openscreen, Blender, FreeCAD, RenderDoc) and FreeCAD CAD-modeling modules; whether the Safari skill itself declares, consumes, or needs these repository files is not established from the evidence shown in this batch.
All 81 owed units are FreeCAD CAD/CAM modules under freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core/ (body.py, cam.py, document.py, draft.py), while the target is skills/cli-anything-safari declared as Safari browser automation; the shown evidence cannot establish whether these modules are shipped or consumed by the declared safari artifact or belong to a sibling repository target, so their declared-vs-actual scope (unexplained residue vs out-of-scope sibling) is undetermined. Separately, contra⟦… 343 more chars …⟧
The target is declared as a Safari browser automation skill, but every unit in this batch is FreeCAD CAD-harness code (draft manipulation, FEM setup, import/export, materials); the shown units do not establish whether the Safari skill invokes or ships this freecad code, so whether it constitutes undeclared functionality relative to the declared purpose cannot be settled here.
Contradictions C103-C105 pair FreeCAD file writes (material JSON export at materials.py:644 in SRC:c0b2fb49b17cf89a, render output-dir reset at motion.py:201/204 in SRC:07ed97c9428a963f) with claims D16/D89/D99/D123/D124/D195/D201/D205 whose texts concern cli-hub previews and video-creation doctor documentation in other targets (browser/agent-harness, cli-anything-plugin, cli-hub-matrix); the claim units (SRC:6cde1cb4aad776c3, SRC:e1c61f4269acf57f, SRC:383ade51b4ffea76, SRC:1a9053b83b29a173, SRC⟦… 201 more chars …⟧
All 90 units in this batch are FreeCAD CAD-harness modules under freecad/agent-harness, while the target root is skills/cli-anything-safari with a declared Safari-browser-automation purpose (safari-mcp wrapper); whether the Safari skill ships or executes these FreeCAD modules is not established by the evidence shown, so the entire batch's relation to the declared purpose is unresolved.
Contradiction C518 pairs the Safari-harness claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (D248, safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md:238) with subprocess.run(ffmpeg...) in freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core/motion.py:685 (SRC:1d6a39d4f21e27a0). The code shown is FreeCAD-harness video encoding of its own rendered frames, which is that harness's declared core capability, and the claim text is homed in a different harness's docs, so the contradiction appears spurious; however the exact sco⟦… 114 more chars …⟧
Code execution
Contradictions C519/C520 not confirmed: claim D248 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' is homed in safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md (safari harness scope, unit content not shown in this batch) while the observed exec is _spawn_live_viewer/_spawn_live_poller in the freecad harness, whose own declared surface lists 'Launch cli-hub live preview watcher when available' and 'Internal background poller for live preview sessions'; D284 is a user warning about concurrently using the safari CLI, which⟦… 107 more chars …⟧
Code execution
Contradictions C119-C124 not confirmed: claims D16/D89/D99/D123/D124/D195/D201/D205 (browser/cli-anything-plugin/cli-hub-matrix preview read-only and honest-reporting bullets, unit contents not shown in this batch) do not on their face prohibit file writes by the freecad harness; the observed writes (export_csv writing a CSV, document_new saving to a user-supplied --output path, poller.log append) are the freecad CLI's declared core functionality. Adjudicated as cross-harness false pairing pendi⟦… 31 more chars …⟧
Persistence
The target is declared as the Safari automation skill (skills/cli-anything-safari), but every unit in this batch is FreeCAD CLI code under freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/ and the cited safety claims (D16, D89, D99, D123, D124, D195, D201, D205) live in browser/agent-harness and cli-anything-plugin files; confirm whether this FreeCAD code is actually shipped by the safari-skill target or is a separate repository target judged in other batches.
Contradiction leads C125/C126/C127 (file_write via export_material/export_project/export_csv) were checked against claims D16, D89, D99, D123, D124, D195, D201, D205 and do not verify: the claims concern read-only preview subcommands and caption-documentation text, while the cited units are explicitly named export commands writing user-specified output files, which is their declared function; confirm no other claim in the full claim set is intended to cover these export commands.
Persistence
The batch target is declared as skill 'cli-anything-safari' (Safari automation via safari-mcp, 84 MCP tools), but every unit in this batch is 'cli-anything-freecad' FreeCAD CLI code; confirm the freecad subtree belongs to this target so its SKILL.md declarations (e.g., D228) govern these units, or whether it ships from a sibling target in the same repository.
Scope mismatch: the target's declared purpose and root are skills/cli-anything-safari (Safari browser automation via safari-mcp), but every unit in this batch lives under freecad/agent-harness/... (FreeCAD CAD CLI harness and its tests). Whether the Safari declaration is meant to cover this FreeCAD harness content, or these units belong to a different artifact in the same repository, cannot be settled from the evidence shown; no residue items were listed for adjudication.
Contradiction leads C128-C149 were verified against the cited units: the observed file writes are pytest fixtures confined to tmp_path (wrapper scripts, PNG/JSON test artifacts, save_document round-trips), which are not the 'cli-hub previews' read-only consumer, not the 'preview live status' probe, and not agent report output, so none of the claims D16/D89/D99/D123/D124/D195/D201/D205 is actually broken; confirming the claims' full context in browser/agent-harness/HARNESS.md and cli-anything-plu⟦… 45 more chars …⟧
Persistence
Residue/EXEC reachability: freecad_macro_gen interpolates numeric property values raw into the generated macro (e.g. obj_{name}.Length = {length}) that is then executed headlessly via FreeCADCmd; only local, user-authored project JSON is shown reaching it, so whether any non-user-authored (agent- or remotely-influenced) project state can reach generate_macro/run_macro_content — making this a macro code-injection channel — cannot be settled from the shown units.
Code execution
Whether the declared target skills/cli-anything-safari loads or executes any of the freecad/openscreen harness code shown in this batch is not established; if it does, that consumption is undeclared for a Safari-automation skill.
No shown unit executes skill_install_cmd; whether another file auto-runs the `npx skills add ... -g -y` command rather than only printing it in the banner is not shown.
Supply chain
Contradiction leads C166-C171 and C558 pair claims homed in browser/cli-anything-plugin/cli-hub-matrix/safari docs with capabilities in freecad/openscreen harness code (preview manifest writes, temp-file cleanup, documented session persistence, ffmpeg thumbnail subprocess); on the shown evidence the claims do not govern those components, but the claim-context files were not shown to confirm scoping.
The target is declared as cli-anything-safari (Safari automation via safari-mcp), but every unit in this batch is the cli-anything-openscreen screen-recording editor; from the evidence shown it cannot be settled whether these openscreen files are actually shipped under the cli-anything-safari target root (which would make an entire video-editing CLI undeclared residue for the stated purpose) or are a sibling artifact in the same repository judged under its own declarations.
All contradiction leads in this batch pair claims with capabilities from different scopes and do not survive verification: D16 ('Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM') is a rationale about frame stability, not a no-write rule; D89/D99/D123/D124 are read-only claims scoped to consumer commands (cli-hub previews, preview latest, preview live status), while the observed writes (temp files in tests, project saves, preview_bundle.py write_json/trajectory writes) belong to the pr⟦… 419 more chars …⟧
Code execution
Whether the openscreen package under openscreen/agent-harness/cli_anything/openscreen/ is shipped or consumed by the cli-anything-safari skill; if it is part of this artifact, its ffmpeg subprocess execution, local preview-bundle writes under Path.home()/.cli-anything/previews, and video editing functionality are undeclared for a Safari browser automation skill, which would be a declared-vs-actual mismatch. The batch's residue list is empty, so this could not be settled from the evidence shown.
Code execution
All owed units in this batch come from the openscreen and renderdoc agent-harness packages rather than the declared cli-anything-safari skill root; are these units actually shipped with the safari target, and if so, which declaration covers their RenderDoc GPU-debugging and REPL-skinning capabilities (adjudication note: the two file_write contradictions C195/C196 were assessed as not holding, since the PNG thumbnail write in capture.py and the JSON export write in pipeline.py are the declared co⟦… 230 more chars …⟧
The target is declared as the cli-anything-safari Safari-automation skill (safari-mcp wrapper), but all 79 units in this batch are cli-anything-renderdoc code (RenderDoc GPU capture CLI: shader/texture export, pipeline dumps, preview bundles) and the residue list is empty; confirm whether the safari skill actually ships or references this renderdoc package, since GPU capture export tooling is outside the declared Safari purpose.
safari_native_click (upstream tool 12, exposed under the declared 1:1 parity over all 84 tools) is described as producing isTrusted:true OS-level CGEvent clicks that pass WAF/bot detection (G2, Cloudflare); adjudicate whether this bot-detection-evasion capability falls inside the declared Safari-automation purpose or constitutes undeclared residue.
Does the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (D247/D248, safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md line 238) scope to unit tests only, or to the whole harness? The e2e file states its subprocess test class is required by HARNESS.md Phase 5 and is skipped unless SAFARI_E2E=1, so contradictions C616-C625 look like scope mismatches rather than broken claims, but the claim unit is not in this batch.
Do the 'no external dependencies' claims (D61/D71/D78/D112/D133, homed in cli-anything-plugin files not shown here) apply to the Safari SKILL.md at all? The observed 'network' values (C424-C427) are example.com navigation targets in usage examples, which is the declared browser-automation core capability, not a fetched dependency, so these appear to be naive matcher false positives.
The target is declared as a Safari browser automation skill (safari-mcp wrapper), but every unit in this batch implements a Shotcut video-editing harness (filter registry, ffprobe/ffmpeg media ops, preview bundles, MLT project management); whether the shotcut harness is inside this target's declared scope or is undeclared residue handled by another batch could not be settled from the evidence shown.
Contradictions C633/C634: does D248 ('No Safari, no network, no subprocess.', safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md:238, force=descriptive) describe only a specific safari-harness component, or does it scope over the sibling shotcut CLI, whose _spawn_live_viewer and _spawn_live_poller spawn detached background processes (subprocess.Popen with start_new_session=True) for its documented live-preview feature? The exec capability is verified in SRC:2f66c1297231626b and SRC:6181b55fef2b11ea, but the claim'⟦… 210 more chars …⟧
Code execution
Contradictions C237-C241: the shotcut CLI's own session/project/log writes (_locked_save_json to ~/.shotcut-cli/sessions/*.json, mlt_xml.write_mlt project saves, poller.log) are declared core session persistence of the shotcut component ('Sessions persist to disk as JSON so they survive process restarts'); the paired read-only claims (D89/D99/D123/D124) describe the cli-hub preview consumer, D16 describes browser page-structure stability, and D195/D201/D205 concern report wording in other compon⟦… 140 more chars …⟧
Persistence
Residue lead R54 (kind=env, value='*', detail=instructed) points at SKILL.md line 146 in unit SRC:194204aa1bb35503, but the fully shown lines 136-151 contain only a filter command table with no environment-variable access; where does the claimed env wildcard access come from?
Credential access
Residue lead R55 (kind=env, value='*', detail=instructed) points at SKILL.md line 186 in unit SRC:f8d7b48c4d0381f3, but the fully shown lines 176-189 contain only a transition command table with no environment-variable access; where does the claimed env wildcard access come from?
Credential access
Contradictions C635/C636/C637 pair Shotcut-code subprocess execution (shotcut_cli.py:755 media_mod.generate_thumbnail; tests/conftest.py ffmpeg subprocess.run and generate_video) with safari-harness claims D248 ('No Safari, no network, no subprocess.') and D284; since the claims are homed in sibling safari/ files not shown in this batch, do those claims scope over the Shotcut CLI (real contradiction) or only over a Safari-specific component (cross-component noise)?
Code execution
The target is declared as a Safari browser-automation skill, but every unit in this batch is Shotcut video-editor code under shotcut/agent-harness; is the Shotcut harness actually shipped by the cli-anything-safari target, and if so where is its inclusion declared relative to the Safari-only description?
All 31 owed units are pytest tests of the Shotcut video-editing harness (shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/tests/test_core.py), while the target declares Safari browser automation via safari-mcp; whether the declared safari target ships or references this Shotcut harness is not determinable from the shown units, so no undeclared-capability finding is asserted here.
Contradictions C638-C664 pair the safari-harness claim D248 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' with ffmpeg/melt/shotcut-CLI subprocess calls that all live in the shotcut module (shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/tests/test_full_e2e.py and utils/melt_backend.py), not in the safari skill. From the claim text alone it cannot be settled whether D248 scopes to the shotcut e2e tests (genuine break) or only to the safari tool's own components (cross-module mispairing). The observed capabi⟦… 330 more chars …⟧
Code execution
Contradictions C640-C664 also cite D284 'Don't run this CLI while another agent (Claude Code, etc.) is actively using safari-mcp via MCP transport'. The batch's subprocess calls run the shotcut CLI (resolved via _resolve_cli('cli-anything-shotcut')), ffmpeg, and melt; none invoke the safari CLI or safari-mcp, so the rule appears not to govern them. Confirming the README's antecedent for 'this CLI' would settle this; adjudication assumes a cross-module mispairing.
Code execution
Contradictions C270-C285 pair file_write leads (temp .mlt/.mp4 writes, makedirs, os.unlink cleanup in shotcut tests and melt_backend) with claims D16/D89/D99/D123/D124/D195/D201/D205. Those claims' texts (shown in the prompt) concern report wording ('Do not write caption doctor passed'), a browser-harness design rationale ('Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM'), and read-only semantics of cli-hub preview commands; none of them is shown to prohibit the shotcut tests' temp-f⟦… 206 more chars …⟧
Persistence
Residue items R56/R57 (kind=env, value='*', detail=instructed) at skills/cli-anything-gimp/SKILL.md lines 83 and 112 cannot be located in the provided unit text for those lines (the layer and filter command tables shown contain no environment-variable instruction), so they cannot be adjudicated as necessary, unexplained, or concealed from the evidence shown.
C431 adjudication: the example.com URL in the Profile Isolation example (DET:bf1d9aa60ddd38e8) is a reserved documentation placeholder shown as a bash example, not a fetched dependency, and most cited claims are scoped elsewhere (D71/D133: SKILL.md self-containedness for understanding; D78/D112: unit tests); it is unclear from evidence shown whether D61 'No external dependencies.' and D247 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' were scoped to those other components' tests/harness rather than th⟦… 99 more chars …⟧
The skill unit declares a Safari automation CLI wrapping safari-mcp (84 tools), but every code unit in this batch implements an unrelated Blender CLI under blender/agent-harness/; whether the actual safari-mcp wrapper contains executable chains is not determinable from the units shown.
The detector leads quote claims ('No Safari, no network, no subprocess.', 'Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM') that do not appear in the cited units; the flagged subprocess and file-write behaviors do exist and are reported, but no claim contradiction is confirmable from the shown text.
The request targets skill 'cli-anything-safari' (Safari automation via safari-mcp), but every served unit belongs to blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender (a Blender CLI harness whose SKILL.md is named cli-anything-blender); the relationship between the declared Safari skill and this Blender content is unestablished.
live_stop sends SIGTERM to a pid read from the on-disk session.json (poller.pid), which is externally writable data; whether tampering with that file to terminate arbitrary user processes is a realistic reach could not be settled from the shown units.
Destructive action
The target declares Safari MCP browser automation, but every served unit is Blender CLI test and utility code; confirm which artifact these units belong to and whether the Safari skill content differs from its declared description.
The PY-CLAIM-CONTRADICTION detector leads quote claims ('No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' and '- Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM') that do not appear in any served unit, so the alleged contradictions cannot be verified against the shown evidence.
Does the blender harness auto-execute the bpy scripts generated by bpy_gen (e.g., blender --python), and can project-controlled values interpolated into the generated code reach that execution from an untrusted source?
Code execution
Can user-supplied text in act type (or other CLI arguments) reach DOMShell's multi-line shell command string without quoting, allowing injected lines to run in the same shell state?
Code execution
Detectors (PY-CLAIM-CONTRADICTION) repeatedly cite a claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' inside domshell_backend.py, but that claim text does not appear in any provided unit; if present it is contradicted by the npx subprocesses and localhost MCP connection. Where does this claim appear and is it surfaced to the user or the agent?
Manipulation
The declared target is skill 'cli-anything-safari' (Safari automation via safari-mcp, 84 tools), but every provided unit implements a Chrome/DOMShell harness whose SKILL.md frontmatter is named 'cli-anything-browser'; confirm whether these files are actually the declared skill's content or a different/misattributed component.
Impersonation
Are validate_url and sanitize_dom_text actually enforced on the harness's navigation and DOM-return paths, or only defined in utils/security.py?
Credential access
Detector leads attribute the claims 'No external dependencies.' (SKILL.md) and 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (video_doctor.py), but neither claim text is present in the units shown; where do these claims appear and do the GitHub URLs and subprocess.run wrappers actually contradict them?
The SKILL.md tells the agent to run `cli-hub matrix install video-creation`; is the cli-hub installer implemented in this repository, and what does it download or execute?
Code execution
A detector cites the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' in video_doctor.py as contradicted by subprocess ffmpeg execution and log writes, but the claim text itself is not present in any unit shown in this batch; where does this claim live and does the code genuinely contradict it?
cli-hub's package docstring declares it downloads and manages CLI-Anything harnesses, but the download source URLs and any pinning/verification are not shown in this batch; where do downloaded harnesses come from?
Supply chain
Is telemetry opt-in or opt-out: the _is_enabled() implementation and the default endpoint constants (POSTHOG_API_HOST, POSTHOG_PROJECT_TOKEN, UMAMI_URL, UMAMI_WEBSITE_ID) live in the unshown header of analytics.py.
Data exfiltration
Where do the claims 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' and 'No external dependencies.' appear (likely the skill's documentation), and does the skill disclose cli-hub's subprocess installs and network telemetry that contradict them?
What is the actual value of MATRIX_REGISTRY_URL, and is the CLI registry consumed by get_cli/fetch_all_clis also fetched from a mutable network URL whose entries reach the shell=True and execvp sinks?
Supply chain
Where does fetch_all_matrices (called by search_capabilities and all_recipes) obtain matrix definitions from, and do those definitions carry install commands or remote skill paths that reach execution?
Supply chain
The detector-extracted claims 'No external dependencies.' and 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' do not appear in any shown unit; their source location in the artifact is unestablished.
Whether registry entry_point or install_hint strings are ever executed by a code path in this artifact rather than only displayed.
Code execution
None of the shown units references Safari or safari-mcp despite the target skill's declared description; the relationship between the cli-hub registry/installer/analytics code shown here and the cli-anything-safari skill entry point is not established by this evidence.
Detector leads DET:6fa771991a2cd9ae and DET:bb029c130b884b6a attribute the claim text 'Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM' to this unit, but that text does not appear anywhere in the unit; the cited lines are the documented save_document project-file writer (os.makedirs of the target's parent dir plus json.dump of the validated project dict), i.e. the module's declared core save capability with no persistence location, network sink, or concealment. Confirm the leads are f⟦… 72 more chars …⟧
The analyzed target is the skill 'skills/cli-anything-safari' (Safari automation wrapping the safari-mcp MCP server), but every owed unit in this batch is FreeCAD CAD/CAM code under freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/; no unit shown implements or references Safari automation, so no behavior chain for the declared skill can be confirmed or refuted from this evidence.
Detector leads DET:0271bfa34741f52c, DET:b9e49ea7b6ba667c and DET:010bcee93d4c906d cite a claim '- Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM' that does not appear in any cited unit; the flagged code (os.makedirs, freecad_backend.export_headless, open(path,'w')) is ordinary local export/material file I/O, so the alleged contradiction cannot be confirmed from the shown content.
The target skill is declared as Safari browser automation via safari-mcp, but every unit in this batch is FreeCAD CAD tooling under freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/; confirm whether these units belong to the cli-anything-safari target or to a sibling artifact, since the declared purpose used for carve-out decisions may not match.
The target declares a Safari browser-automation skill (cli-anything-safari), yet every owed unit is FreeCAD 3D-harness code under freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core; confirm whether the bundle cross-ships unrelated tooling under the Safari skill identity.
The request targets skill 'cli-anything-safari' (Safari browser automation via safari-mcp), but every unit shown is FreeCAD CAD-harness code under freecad/agent-harness/; confirm whether this FreeCAD code is actually shipped or consumed by the safari skill artifact, since the mismatch could indicate repackaged content.
All ten detector leads (PY-CLAIM-CONTRADICTION, PERSIST) cite a claim text ('Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM') that appears in none of the shown units; the flagged writes are plain JSON session/preview files under .cli-anything, not persistence locations, so the leads were treated as unconfirmed — confirm whether a doc file making that claim exists elsewhere in the artifact.
The PY-CLAIM-CONTRADICTION detector leads (DET:bb6a4a2f7ec2bce4, DET:dd6d12d736491392, DET:2d365fc8d21185f4, DET:91be62eb2f3538bc) attribute a claim 'Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM' to spreadsheet.py, but that claim text appears nowhere in the cited content; only the os.makedirs/open('w') writes in export_csv are real. Confirm whether the leads' claim-source mapping is a cross-artifact error.
Persistence
The declared target skill is 'cli-anything-safari' (Safari browser automation), but every analyzed unit implements a FreeCAD CAD CLI under freecad/agent-harness; whether this FreeCAD code is shipped or consumed by the safari skill, and how the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' relates to the mismatch, is not shown in this pass.
All document/part/sketch/body/material operations delegate to imported modules (doc_mod, parts_mod, sketch_mod, body_mod, mat_mod, preview_mod, Session) whose implementations are outside the shown line spans; whether any of them adds network access, downloads, or additional subprocess behavior is unverified.
Code execution
The target skill is declared as Safari browser automation (safari-mcp wrapper), but every reviewed unit implements a FreeCAD CLI (export/preview/motion/mesh/draft/import/assembly/techdraw/fem); the relationship between the shown FreeCAD code and the declared Safari capability is not established by this evidence.
Detector leads DET:03c98539914e3b3b and DET:e8d8086a5d03a971 allege a PERSIST claim-contradiction citing a docstring ('Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM') that does not appear in the cited units; the referenced writes are user-supplied export/CSV output paths, which are the declared export capability, so the leads are unconfirmed as persistence behavior in the shown text.
Persistence
The request targets skill:skills/cli-anything-safari (Safari MCP wrapper) but every shipped unit is FreeCAD CLI code (freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/...), and detector claim text references Safari/DOM stability claims that appear in no shown unit; is this batch mismatched to the target or does the artifact mislabel its content?
The detector messages quote claims ('No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' and a DOM-stability claim) that appear in no shown unit; which shipped document makes these claims, and is the FreeCAD subprocess/env code actually governed by that claim such that it is contradicted?
Code execution
The target is declared as the cli-anything-safari skill, but every served unit is FreeCAD harness code; does the safari skill ship, reference, or invoke these FreeCAD modules at runtime?
The macro generator interpolates project-JSON values (names, positions, output paths) directly into Python source executed by FreeCADCmd without quoting or escaping; if a project file is obtained from a shared or untrusted location this becomes code injection into the generated macro — is project JSON ever loaded from untrusted sources?
Code execution
Detector DET:755309435839f796 cites the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' which does not appear in any shown unit; where does that claim live and does documentation contradict the ffmpeg subprocess use in extract_thumbnail?
The target is skills/cli-anything-safari but every owed unit is from the freecad and openscreen harnesses of the same monorepo; confirm the scope relationship between the safari skill and these harness files.
The batch target is declared as skill cli-anything-safari (Safari automation via safari-mcp with 84 MCP tools), but every owed unit belongs to the cli-anything-openscreen video-editing CLI whose SKILL.md is named cli-anything-openscreen; the actual Safari instruction surface and safari-mcp wrapper are not present in the shown evidence, so no Safari behavior chain could be traced in this pass.
The PY-CLAIM-CONTRADICTION detector leads cite claim text ('- Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM' and 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.') that appears nowhere in the shown unit texts; the leads could not be confirmed against any cited unit and are treated as unconfirmed.
Detector leads allege a claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' contradicted by subprocess execution in tests/test_full_e2e.py and utils/ffmpeg_backend.py, but that claim text appears in none of the shown unit spans, so the claimed contradiction could not be confirmed or refuted from this batch.
Code execution
The reviewed target declares a Safari-automation skill (safari-mcp, 84 tools), yet every unit in this batch implements an ffmpeg video pipeline (openscreen harness) or a RenderDoc GPU-capture harness; whether the Safari skill actually ships or invokes these sibling harnesses is not determinable from the shown content.
The target is declared as a Safari browser automation skill wrapping the safari-mcp MCP server, but every unit in this batch is RenderDoc GPU capture analysis code; no Safari/MCP tool definitions or instructions chaining into this harness are shown, so whether any cross-skill behavior chain exists cannot be assessed from the evidence shown.
Detector leads (PY-CLAIM-CONTRADICTION) cite a claim '- Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM' that does not appear in any shown unit; the cited excerpts (open(..., 'w'), os.makedirs(..., exist_ok=True), _write_json, thumbnail/save_action_outputs) all write to user-specified export and bundle directories, so the alleged persistence contradiction could not be confirmed as harmful and no finding was raised from the leads.
The target is declared as 'cli-anything-safari' (Safari automation via safari-mcp with 84 MCP tools), but every shipped unit is a RenderDoc graphics-debugger CLI ('cli-anything-renderdoc'); confirm whether the correct bundle was attached or the safari skill actually wraps renderdoc content.
Detector leads quote the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.', which does not appear in any shown unit text, while the test files do invoke the CLI via subprocess.run; confirm whether any test-scope guarantee is contradicted or the lead is spurious.
Code execution
SKILL.md instructs the agent to run 'cli-hub previews open /path/to/bundle', a viewer binary not shipped in these units; confirm what cli-hub previews open executes or renders (e.g., HTML generated from capture data) and whether bundle content is rendered unsandboxed.
Code execution
The singleton-killer that terminates concurrent safari-mcp processes (lines 22-49 of ~/safari-mcp/index.js) lives in the out-of-scope npm dependency; the artifact only documents and can trigger it — does the spawn path in safari_backend.py always expose concurrent sessions to this kill behavior?
Destructive action
Detector leads cite claims ('No external dependencies.', 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.') that do not appear in the text of any shown unit, so the claimed contradictions (example.com URLs, piped python3, npm view, subprocess tests) could not be confirmed as contradictions in this pass; the example.com references and the screenshot base64-decode-to-file pipe verified as benign documentation examples, and the 'silently send' lead in test_parity.py refers to sending a wrongly named argument⟦… 19 more chars …⟧
The PY-CLAIM-CONTRADICTION detector leads attribute the claims 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' and '- Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM' to the shotcut modules, but neither claim string appears in any shown unit; the underlying behaviors (subprocess melt render, ffprobe probe, ffmpeg thumbnail, session JSON writes, temp-file unlink and symlink swap inside self-managed preview dirs) match each module's documented video-editing purpose and none is in a persistence ⟦… 136 more chars …⟧
Detector leads DET:5ef186ee2e5aa78f, DET:e8c5ce92e4774061, DET:cc8ea73d1f2ae94e and DET:ad4e6dba3b601885 attribute the claim '- Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM' to session.py, but that text appears in none of the shown session.py units; the file_write excerpts they flag (_locked_save_json, session-state JSON persistence) are local session metadata writes with no network sink, so the alleged claim/exec contradiction cannot be confirmed from the cited content.
Persistence
Detector leads DET:0a064a1ad1fecf3c and DET:41ded118a2e6d419 quote the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' as being contradicted by the detached subprocess spawns in _spawn_live_viewer/_spawn_live_poller; the exec side is confirmed in the cited units but the claim text itself appears in no shown unit, so whether an honest-description contradiction exists is unsettled.
Code execution
The reviewed target is skill 'cli-anything-safari' (Safari automation via safari-mcp) but every unit in this batch belongs to a Shotcut video-editing CLI package; confirm whether the served content matches the intended artifact.
Detector leads pair the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' with confirmed local subprocess.exec calls (ffmpeg with fixed literal argv, python -m module launch), but that claim text does not appear in any cited unit; where does the claim originate and does shipped skill code contradict it?
Code execution
The target skill declares Safari browser automation via safari-mcp, but every audited unit is a Shotcut video-editing pytest file (timeline, filters, export, melt); confirm whether these test files actually belong to the cli-anything-safari bundle or to a sibling artifact.
The target skill is declared as cli-anything-safari (Safari automation via safari-mcp), but every unit in this batch is Shotcut video-editor code (E2E tests, melt backend, MLT XML utilities, REPL skin); the relationship between the declared Safari skill and the shipped Shotcut code could not be settled from the evidence shown.
Detector leads cite the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' as contradicted by subprocess calls, but that claim text does not appear in any shown unit span, so the contradiction target could not be verified; the observed subprocess usage itself is list-argument execution of the artifact's own CLI, melt, and ffmpeg on temp files, which is benign E2E testing with no source-to-sink chain.
Code execution
[invalid file request] What does the line-238 claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' scope over — the safari CLI's own test suite, the safari harness only, or other components shipped in the same repository such as the blender harness?
Code execution
[invalid file request] What does the line-238 sentence 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (claims D247/D248) describe — the whole harness, one component, or the test suite — and does it apply to browser/agent-harness/cli_anything/browser/utils/domshell_backend.py, which runs npx subprocesses and an MCP connection? This decides contradictions C460-C475 and the D247 pairing of C411.
Code execution
[invalid file request] Which CLI does the line-153 warning 'Don't run this CLI while another agent (Claude Code, etc.) is actively using safari-mcp via MCP transport' (claim D284) govern, and is the browser backend's npx/MCP activity in scope for it? This decides the D284 pairing of C460-C475.
Code execution
[invalid file request] What does the safety claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (D248, line 238, unit SRC:8538cf963ab04bb7) scope to — the whole safari harness or only a specific pure helper module? This decides whether contradictions C476–C490 (asyncio.run(_call_execute(...)) in browser/agent-harness DOMShell code spawning stdio MCP sessions and driving network navigation) really break it, and likewise for D284 (safari-mcp concurrent-use warning, which the DOMShell/Chrome backend does⟦… 10 more chars …⟧
Code execution
[invalid file request] What component or command does the line-238 claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' describe?
Code execution
[invalid file request] What does the line-147 claim 'No external dependencies.' refer to — the Python package's dependencies, SKILL.md content, or unit tests?
Supply chain
[invalid file request] What does the line-238 claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' scope to — unit tests only or the whole harness — given the e2e test file states HARNESS.md Phase 5 requires subprocess tests?
Code execution
[invalid file request] What exactly does the line 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' at line 238 describe — the whole harness, a specific module, or specific offline/XML-editing commands? This determines whether the subprocess.run calls to ffprobe/ffmpeg in shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/core/media.py (probe_media, _probe_with_ffprobe, generate_thumbnail) and preview capture genuinely contradict claim D248.
Code execution
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] Only lines 1-9 (frontmatter and its decoded form) of the target skill's SKILL.md were shown. Does the remaining body of cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md contain agent-facing instructions that steer beyond the declared Safari automation task (hijack, auto-run steps, secrecy, hidden directives, reviewer-directed claims)?
Agent hijacking
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] Does the Safari skill's own body contain directives beyond Safari automation (hidden instructions, install or execute steps, reviewer-aimed text), and does it reference safari-mcp or DOMShell as the backend?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-anything-plugin/guides/mcp-backend.md] Does the MCP backend guide instruct fetching or executing unpinned remote packages, modifying agent MCP configuration, or passing credentials into MCP tool calls?
Supply chain
[file request cli-anything-plugin/guides/pypi-publishing.md] Does the publishing guide instruct unattended uploads to PyPI or handle registry credentials/tokens in agent-readable form?
Supply chain
[file request cli-anything-plugin/skill_generator.py] Does the SKILL.md generator inject hidden, encoded, or behavior-conditioning content into the generated skill files beyond documenting the CLI?
Tool poisoning
[file request cli-anything-plugin/templates/SKILL.md.template] Does the Jinja2 SKILL.md template embed agent-behavior directives beyond documenting the generated CLI?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/references/story-structure-audio.md] This module is mandatory reading for non-trivial videos per the skill; does it contain hidden directives, hijack text, or instructions beyond video story methodology?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/references/captions.md] This captions reference is instructed reading for polished caption work; does it steer the agent beyond caption design or contain concealed directives?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/references/source-triage.md] This source-triage reference is instructed reading for found-footage work; does it contain directives beyond source selection or concealed instructions?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/references/nle-shotcut-kdenlive.md] This NLE reference is instructed reading for Shotcut/Kdenlive workflows; does it contain directives beyond NLE editing or concealed instructions?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/references/sound-design.md] This sound-design reference is instructed reading for polished edits; does it contain directives beyond audio work or concealed instructions?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/references/render-doctor.md] This render-doctor reference is instructed reading for every promoted final; does it contain directives beyond render verification or concealed instructions?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/scripts/video_doctor.py] The skill instructs agents to run this bundled script (probe/captions/sources/frames/tail/audio/lint subcommands with --scan-path, --sources-manifest, --music-manifest, --sound-design); does it perform any network access, credential access, or writes beyond media analysis?
Code execution
[file request docs/cli-matrix/matrix_registry.schema.md] This schema defines the provider registry behind 'cli-hub matrix install video-creation'; does it specify remote install sources, unpinned refs, or install-time scripts for matrix members?
Supply chain
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/scripts/video_doctor.py] The reference docs instruct running this script repeatedly (probe/frames/tail/audio/captions/sources/lint); does it make network requests, read credentials or cookies, or write outside the declared report/frame directories?
Code execution
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/matrix_skill.py] Confirm how the published-URL fallback fetches SKILL.md (is the URL or commit pinned, what happens on fetch failure) and exactly what content is written into the agent-facing skill files and linked remotely.
Supply chain
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/registry.py] What exact URLs are the harness and public registries fetched from, are they version-pinned, and is the fetched registry content validated before installer commands are derived from it?
Supply chain
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/installer.py] Show the _run_command implementation and the full flow from registry-defined command strings (including curl|bash entries) to shell=True execution, and whether any allowlist or pinning constrains which commands can run.
Code execution
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/analytics.py] What endpoint or provider receives the analytics events, which fields (including the agent-detection flag and CLI/matrix properties) are transmitted, and how does the opt-out mechanism work?
Data exfiltration
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] The target is declared as a Safari/safari-mcp automation skill, but every owed unit in this batch is FreeCAD harness code or a multi-app preview-protocol roadmap (shotcut, openscreen, blender, freecad, renderdoc). Does the skill's own frontmatter/body declare Safari tooling, reference these FreeCAD/preview files, or instruct the agent to act on content beyond Safari automation?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-anything-plugin/HARNESS.md] docs/PREVIEW_PROTOCOL.md states HARNESS.md is updated with 'preview requirements' and 'tells future harnesses how to adopt preview support'; does HARNESS.md contain directives telling an agent to run bundled scripts or adopt behaviors (auto-run setup steps) beyond the declared Safari task?
Agent hijacking
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core/motion.py] DET:038dc59a8e57b354 reports 'subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True)' at motion.py:685 contradicting a claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.'; the owed unit for this file covers lines 1-640 only. Does this region execute subprocesses, and where does the 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' claim text appear?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/freecad_cli.py] Show the code around lines 2199-2200 (export_mod.export_project call with overwrite) to verify or refute detector lead DET:03c98539914e3b3b's claimed contradiction between documented export behavior and the file write.
Persistence
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] No unit from the declared target skills/cli-anything-safari was served; show the Safari skill's SKILL.md so its frontmatter, body, setup steps, and any safari-mcp MCP metadata can be judged for instruction-surface behavior.
Agent hijacking
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/skills/SKILL.md] The HARNESS.md structure lists skills/SKILL.md as the agent-discovery manifest for the safari harness but its content is not in this batch; does it contain instructions steering the agent beyond Safari automation (overrides, secrecy, auto-run steps, hidden directives)?
Agent hijacking
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/safari_backend.py] Does the MCP stdio client pin a version of safari-mcp when spawning the npx subprocess, or does it fetch and execute whatever npm currently serves?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/resources/tools.json] Do any of the 84 bundled tool descriptions or schema texts contain agent-directed instructions (conditioning other tools, secrecy, context harvesting) rather than pure parameter documentation?
Tool poisoning
[file request cli-anything-plugin/guides/mcp-backend.md] The safari HARNESS.md states it follows this referenced pattern guide; does the guide instruct any setup/auto-run or data-handling steps that steer the agent beyond wrapping the MCP server?
Agent hijacking
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] Does HARNESS.md contain absolute claims such as 'No external dependencies' or 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess' about the harness pattern, and do those claims conflict with the CLI's actual subprocess spawning and npm registry access seen in the detector leads?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/tests/test_full_e2e.py] Does line 122 of test_full_e2e.py read /etc/passwd through Safari, or does it only assert that URL validation blocks the file:// scheme, as the security.py docstring example 'validate_url(file:///etc/passwd)' suggests?
Credential access
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/resources/tools.json] Do any of the 84 bundled safari-mcp tool names or descriptions, from which the CLI generates its agent-facing commands, condition how other tools are called, request conversation/env/credential data in parameters, or route data to unexpected destinations (tool poisoning)?
Tool poisoning
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/safari_backend.py] Does safari_backend.call() pin the safari-mcp version (e.g. npx safari-mcp@2.7.8) when spawning the subprocess, or does it fetch the latest package from the npm registry at runtime?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/tests/test_parity.py] What does the text around line 333 containing 'silently send' actually instruct — is it an agent-directed secrecy directive (HIJACK) or an ordinary test assertion/string?
Agent hijacking
[file request safari/agent-harness/SAFARI.md] Does this referenced architecture document, which agents may read via the skill's More Information pointers, contain directives that steer the agent beyond Safari automation (role hijack, secrecy, auto-run steps, off-task data access)?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-anything-plugin/guides/mcp-backend.md] Does this referenced MCP backend pattern guide instruct fetching code or instructions from mutable URLs, auto-running setup scripts, or other behavior beyond the declared wrapper task?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/security.py] Does security.py actually enforce the documented URL scheme blocklist and the optional CLI_ANYTHING_SAFARI_BLOCK_PRIVATE private-network block on all navigation paths including the raw escape hatch, or is the documented validation absent or bypassable?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/safari_backend.py] Does the Safari backend collect the full process environment via os.environ.copy() and pass it to any subprocess, daemon, or network destination, and which destination receives it?
Credential access
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/security.py] What does the security module do with CLI_ANYTHING_SAFARI_BLOCK_PRIVATE, and does this file contain any instruction-like text directed at the agent rather than code-level checks?
Credential access
[file request browser/agent-harness/cli_anything/browser/utils/security.py] Is the string 'Ignore previous instructions' at line 189 part of a defensive list of injection patterns being screened for, or an operative directive that reaches the agent's context?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/installer.py] Under what conditions does the installer fetch and execute remote shell scripts (curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh; irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 | iex), and is this path reachable from the cli-anything-safari skill?
Code execution
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] No instruction-surface units were served for skill cli-anything-safari in this batch; does its frontmatter and body (including any referenced docs) contain directives that steer the agent beyond Safari automation (override/role hijack, secrecy, auto-run prerequisite scripts, conditioning other MCP tools, context harvesting, reviewer-directed claims)?
Agent hijacking
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What mechanism does the safety claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' at line 238 describe, and does its scope extend beyond the Safari harness to the subprocess.Popen calls in blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/blender_cli.py (contradictions C432/C433)?
Code execution
[file request blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/utils/bpy_gen.py] Does generate_full_script emit only scene reconstruction and render commands for the provided project JSON, with no network access, subprocess calls, or reads of files outside the scene?
Code execution
[file request blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/utils/blender_backend.py] How does render_scene_headless execute the generated bpy script (which binary and arguments), and can project-controlled values escape the declared blender --background --python invocation?
Code execution
[file request blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/utils/preview_bundle.py] Do prepare_bundle, finalize_bundle, append_live_trajectory, and the fingerprint helpers write only under the preview root and perform no network or off-host transfers?
Persistence
[file request blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/skills/SKILL.md] Does the portion of SKILL.md after line 159 declare or instruct any capability beyond the scene/render command tables shown (environment variables, network, telemetry, hooks) that bears on residues R48–R52?
Credential access
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] What does the cli-anything-safari skill's own SKILL.md instruct, and does it reference, import, or ship the blender/agent-harness cli_anything Blender CLI files that constitute this batch's units?
Supply chain
[file request blender/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] Does the blender harness's own documentation declare subprocess execution of the Blender binary and headless rendering as its declared core capability, which would make the observed subprocess and generated-script execution necessary rather than undeclared for that component?
Code execution
[file request browser/agent-harness/cli_anything/browser/utils/domshell_backend.py] Verify the EXEC/SUPPLY chain: does domshell_backend.py only forward constructed domshell_execute command strings to the npx @apireno/domshell stdio MCP subprocess, or is there any code path reaching a host shell, writing host files, or sending data off-host beyond the stdio channel — and does the npx invocation pin a version?
Code execution
[file request browser/agent-harness/cli_anything/browser/utils/security.py] Does validate_url actually block the schemes (file://, javascript:, data:) and optionally private networks as open_page's documentation claims, so the stated safety behavior matches the code?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What scope does the line-238 claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' describe — unit tests only or the harness at large — to confirm the flagged example.com usage examples in the separate browser harness README cannot contradict it?
Data exfiltration
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] Does the cli-anything-safari skill (declared: Safari automation via safari-mcp, 84 tools) ship, reference, or invoke the browser agent-harness DOMShell/Chrome backend shown in this batch (domshell_backend.py open_url 'Navigate to a URL in Chrome', security.py, repl_skin.py), or is that an independent repo component batched alongside it?
Code execution
[file request browser/agent-harness/cli_anything/browser/utils/domshell_backend.py] How do _call_execute and _start_daemon launch the DOMShell MCP server (the units' docstrings mention fresh stdio sessions with 'npx' server spawns per call): what package/URL is spawned and is it version-pinned? This determines whether the exec chain reaches unpinned remote code (SUPPLY).
Supply chain
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] Does the cli-anything-safari skill's SKILL.md expose exactly the declared 84 safari-mcp tools 1:1 and restrict execution to Safari automation, or does it pull in the generic GUI-harness install/exec surface (apt installs, npx backends, PyPI publishing) documented in the plugin units?
Code execution
[file request cli-anything-plugin/repl_skin.py] repl_skin.py is instructed to be copied into every generated CLI's utils/ and executed there (banner, prompt, help, messages); does it contain only presentation logic or also network, exec, persistence, or agent-control-plane behavior?
Code execution
[file request cli-anything-plugin/skill_generator.py] skill_generator.py is run by the agent to generate SKILL.md; does it do anything beyond extracting CLI metadata and writing skill files (network access, subprocess execution, writes outside the harness/skills directories)?
Code execution
[file request cli-anything-plugin/HARNESS.md] Do the read-only claims (D89/D99) scope strictly to the `cli-hub previews` consumer commands, confirming that producer-side writes in preview_bundle.py and skill_generator.py do not contradict them (contradictions C50-C53 adjudicated as spurious detector pairings)?
Persistence
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/references/story-structure-audio.md] This referenced guide is mandated reading before final assembly (SRC:921b57f592411e25); does it contain agent directives beyond storyboard planning guidance such as hidden instructions, exfiltration, or conditioning of other tools?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/references/source-triage.md] This referenced guide is mandated reading for found-footage deliverables (SRC:2b0f416b4a03d00c); does it contain agent directives beyond source-classification guidance such as hidden instructions, credential access, or exfiltration?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/references/sound-design.md] This referenced guide is mandated reading for sound design patterns (SRC:11d208c330907e8a); does it contain agent directives beyond audio guidance such as hidden instructions, credential access, or exfiltration?
Agent hijacking
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/scripts/video_doctor.py] What do the probe/frames/tail/audio/captions/sources/lint subcommands of this bundled script actually do — any network access, reads outside the task directory, or writes beyond the declared report JSON paths?
Code execution
[file request cli-anything-plugin/HARNESS.md] Do the claims at line 147 ('No external dependencies.') and line 269 ('SKILL.md must be self-contained (no external dependencies for understanding)') scope to the cli-anything-plugin only or to every skill in the bundle, deciding whether C416-C420 genuinely contradict D61/D71?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What component does the line-238 claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' describe, and does its scope include cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/scripts/video_doctor.py?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/README.md] What CLI does the line-153 warning about concurrent safari-mcp MCP-transport use refer to, and does its scope include cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/scripts/video_doctor.py?
Code execution
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/scripts/video_doctor.py] Does the unshown remainder of video_doctor.py (argparse/main dispatch after the shown functions) restrict execution to the shown local ffmpeg/ffprobe diagnostics, or does it add network access, downloads, credential reads, or additional exec sinks?
Code execution
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/registry.py] What registry URLs do fetch_all_clis/get_cli fetch from, are they pinned or mutable, and do registry entries supply install_cmd/entry_point/npx_cmd strings that installer._run_command executes with shell=True or that cli-hub launch execs?
Supply chain
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/preview.py] Which preview functions write files or start servers, and is `preview live status` a read-only status probe as claimed in D99?
Persistence
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What component does the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (D247/D248) describe, and do cli-hub's telemetry network calls, execvp launch, and installer subprocess usage fall under it?
Code execution
[file request cli-anything-plugin/HARNESS.md] What does the claim 'No external dependencies.' (D61) describe, and does cli-hub's requests-based telemetry network contradict it?
Data exfiltration
[file request SKILL.md] Does the cli-anything-safari skill instruct the agent to install or run cli-hub (thereby adopting its telemetry, agent fingerprinting, and registry-driven shell installs), or is cli-hub independent of this target?
Supply chain
[file request cli-hub/README.md] Does any user-facing cli-hub documentation disclose the default-on PostHog/Umami telemetry and the CLI_HUB_NO_ANALYTICS opt-out?
Data exfiltration
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/installer.py] How does _run_command execute the registry-provided command strings (shell=True versus argv list), and what do _command_exists, _find_uv and _find_npm do?
Code execution
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/registry.py] Where do CLI registry entries (install_cmd, uninstall_cmd, npm_package, skill_md) originate — bundled static data or the network-fetched matrix registry — and are package versions pinned?
Supply chain
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/analytics.py] What telemetry does analytics.py send (event names, destination endpoint/URL), when does it fire (install, uninstall, launch, visit, first-run), how is opt-out implemented, and does _detect_is_agent/detect_invocation_context change what is collected or sent when an agent environment is detected?
Data exfiltration
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/installer.py] Does installer.py execute install commands supplied by the remotely fetched registry (install_cmd, pipe commands such as curl|bash via shell=True, pip install git+ URLs), and is there any version pinning, checksum, or allowlist applied before execution; where does it record installed.json?
Supply chain
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/matrix.py] Which URL(s) does matrix.py fetch matrix registries from, does it cache them to disk like registry.py, and does fetched matrix content (skill_md paths, provider entries, agent-skill providers) drive file writes or command execution?
Supply chain
[file request cli-hub/src/cli_hub/analytics.py] What endpoint does analytics._send_event POST to, exactly which fields are included in the outbound payload, is telemetry enabled by default, and how does _parent_process_commands enumerate parent-process command lines?
Data exfiltration
[file request cli-hub/src/cli_hub/installer.py] Confirm that _run_command executes pipe/&& commands with shell=True and that install_cmd strings taken from the registry (e.g. curl | bash) are executed verbatim by install_cli.
Code execution
[file request cli-hub/src/cli_hub/registry.py] Where does fetch_all_clis obtain the CLI/matrix registry (bundled file or remote URL such as clianything.cc), and can install_cmd values be supplied or updated from the network at runtime?
Supply chain
[file request cli-anything-plugin/HARNESS.md] What exactly does the claim that `cli-hub previews ...` is the read-only consumer for inspect/html/watch/open cover — does the surrounding text acknowledge that `previews html -o output.html` writes an output HTML file, or does it assert the commands perform no writes at all?
Persistence
[file request browser/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What is the context of the claim 'Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM' — is it a file_write safety rule that the preview protocol's `-o`/`[--open]` options could break, or a page-diffing stability note unrelated to preview bundle writes?
Persistence
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] Does the declared safari skill's instructions or scripts reference, import, or execute anything under freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/ (document.py, cam.py, body.py, draft.py), i.e., does the Safari-declared artifact ship or consume FreeCAD CAD/CAM code?
Supply chain
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/utils/freecad_macro_gen.py] export_project passes project JSON to generate_macro and executes the result headlessly; does generate_macro emit anything beyond FreeCAD scene-building and export operations (shell/subprocess calls, network access, reads of files outside the export target)?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/utils/freecad_backend.py] export_project delegates to freecad_backend.export_headless(macro_content, output_path, timeout=120); does export_headless execute the macro with anything beyond invoking FreeCAD headlessly, and does it send any data off-host?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core/motion.py] The decoded unit SRC:61a87c80d4571e23 lists docstrings for render functions ('Render a motion sequence to a real frame directory via FreeCAD GUI capture' and PNG-to-MP4/WebM/GIF encoding) whose bodies are not shown in this batch; motion.py imports subprocess and tempfile and _ffmpeg_path resolves a binary — what commands do the render/encode functions execute and where do they write?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/utils/freecad_macro_gen.py] _motion_frames calls macro_gen._render_spec_for_part and several modules defer actual work to 'macro generation' and 'macro execution' — does the generated FreeCAD macro execution run anything beyond FreeCAD scene scripting (shell commands, network access, reads outside the project)?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What command or mode does the line 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (line 238, claim D248) describe, and is this claim scoped to the safari harness only (which would make the ffmpeg subprocess.run in freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core/motion.py:685, C518, a spurious pairing rather than a contradiction)?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/utils/freecad_backend.py] How does run_macro_content execute the generated FreeCAD macro (binary, arguments, working directory, environment, any network access), and does it perform anything beyond a local FreeCAD invocation with the macro text supplied by motion.py/preview.py?
Code execution
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] Does the cli-anything-safari skill declaration or its referenced entrypoints actually use the freecad/agent-harness modules shown in this batch (preview.py, session.py, sketch.py, spreadsheet.py), or are these FreeCAD CAD-harness modules outside the declared Safari browser-automation purpose of this target?
Persistence
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core/export.py] What does the generated FreeCAD macro for export (used by export_page_pdf/export_page_svg, which only record metadata) contain and execute — is it limited to rendering the recorded page, or does it interpolate project-controlled or arbitrary strings into executed code?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/freecad_cli.py] What do the helper functions _spawn_live_poller and _spawn_live_viewer (called by preview live start) execute — subprocess command lines and target binaries — and do they or the background poller loop perform any network or off-host communication?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/preview.py] Do preview_mod.capture/latest/live_start/live_push/run_live_poller write only within the project or session bundle directories, and do they contact any network endpoint or read files unrelated to the open project?
Data exfiltration
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/utils/repl_skin.py] freecad_cli.py imports ReplSkin from this module for the declared interactive `repl` command; does ReplSkin perform any network, subprocess, file, or credential access beyond interactive terminal input/output?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/pyproject.toml] The SKILL.md instructs `pip install -e freecad/agent-harness`; does this package manifest declare install-time scripts, console entry points beyond the freecad CLI, or any build hook that executes code at install time?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] Is the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (line 238) scoped to the safari package's own harness/tests, or is it a repo-wide prohibition that the freecad package's subprocess-spawning backend and CLI tests (SRC:3639de51a2b43529, SRC:08d7d4059522cbba, SRC:a1b8fea3d05cdd18, SRC:b842d827140f516b) would actually contradict? Current adjudication: refuted as a cross-package mispairing.
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] Does the freecad package's own harness documentation declare headless FreeCADCmd subprocess execution, temporary macro script writes/deletion, export output directory creation, and project JSON file writes as its declared core behavior (confirming the necessary/declared-core adjudication of residue R45 and contradiction leads C150-C557)?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What mechanism does the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (line 238) describe — is it scoped to a specific safari-harness code path rather than a repository-wide prohibition, which would resolve C558 as a false cross-harness match?
Code execution
[file request browser/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] Is the mandatory claim '- Stable: Page updates don't change structure as much as DOM' (line 171) a descriptive stability note about page snapshots rather than a prohibition on file writes, which would reject C166-C168?
Persistence
[file request cli-anything-plugin/HARNESS.md] Do the 'read-only consumer' claims (D89/D99, lines 508 and 617) scope only to the cli-hub preview consumer commands and not to harness-side writing of preview bundles, which would reject C166-C171?
Persistence
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] Does the safari skill reference, import, or instruct the agent to run any freecad or openscreen harness code (e.g., repl_skin.py, preview bundles, ffmpeg paths) shipped elsewhere in this repository?
Supply chain
[file request openscreen/agent-harness/cli_anything/openscreen/core/session.py] Where are SESSION_DIR and _locked_save_json defined, and do project/session writes go only to the user-specified project path and a local session directory with no other destinations?
Persistence
[file request openscreen/agent-harness/cli_anything/openscreen/core/export.py] Does export render execute only local ffmpeg processing of the open project, with no network access, remote code fetch, or execution of anything beyond the declared rendering?
Code execution
[file request openscreen/agent-harness/cli_anything/openscreen/core/preview.py] Do preview capture and latest write only local preview bundles, manifests, and trajectory.json under the bundle root, and do they invoke any external commands or network beyond the declared ffmpeg rendering?
Persistence
[file request openscreen/agent-harness/cli_anything/openscreen/core/media.py] Do media probe, check, and extract_thumbnail only run local ffmpeg/ffprobe on the user-supplied paths, with no side effects beyond the requested output frame?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What does the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' at line 238 (D248) actually scope — the whole safari CLI or a specific read-only preview/status path? This determines whether the pairing of D248 with openscreen ffmpeg subprocess calls (C559, C581-C585) could ever constitute a real contradiction.
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/README.md] What is the context of the line-153 warning (D284) 'Don't run this CLI while another agent (Claude Code, etc.) is actively using safari-mcp via MCP transport' — is it a concurrency caveat or a claim that the safari CLI spawns no subprocesses, relevant to adjudicating leads pairing D284 with the openscreen subprocess tests?
Code execution
[file request openscreen/agent-harness/cli_anything/openscreen/utils/repl_skin.py] What is the literal value of _SKILL_SOURCE_REPO used by the banner's 'npx skills add ... --skill ... -g -y' install command, and is that remote source pinned to a commit or tag?
Supply chain
[file request renderdoc/agent-harness/cli_anything/renderdoc/utils/preview_bundle.py] Do bundle_root, prepare_bundle, finalize_bundle, write_json, and append_live_trajectory write only inside the local preview bundle root/trajectory file, or do they also write host configuration or send data off-host (this determines whether the preview bundle writes in SRC:7eec10e85015d81b and SRC:883ecef644e6c2d6 stay within the declared local-export purpose)?
Persistence
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What does the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (line 238, D248) actually scope: only the safari harness's own offline test suite, or all harnesses/tests in the repository? This batch's RenderDoc tests (test_core.py, test_full_e2e.py) invoke the CLI via subprocess.run, which the deterministic pass flagged as contradicting D248; the file_write/exec contradiction leads C216-C219 and C374-C376 versus D16/D89/D99/D123/D124/D195/D201/D205 wer⟦… 255 more chars …⟧
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/safari_backend.py] Does the MCP stdio client spawn `npx -y safari-mcp` without a version pin, and does it transmit anything beyond MCP tool calls (no telemetry or extra network destinations)?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/safari_cli.py] Do the dynamically registered commands match the declared five-command structure and registry-only surface, with no extra commands performing file reads, credential access, or network calls beyond the declared MCP routing?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/security.py] Does validate_url actually block the schemes listed in HARNESS.md (file, javascript, data, vbscript, about, browser-internal, x-apple) and default-allow only http/https, with private-IP blocking opt-in via CLI_ANYTHING_SAFARI_BLOCK_PRIVATE?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/resources/tools.json] Do any of the 84 bundled tool schemas or descriptions contain injected instructions or conditioning text beyond legitimate parameter documentation?
Tool poisoning
[file request safari/agent-harness/scripts/extract_tools.py] Is the extractor a pure offline parser that only writes tools.json, with no network access or execution of the parsed safari-mcp source?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/skills/SKILL.md] What instructions does the agent-discovery SKILL.md give agents, and do any of them override safety prompts, demand secrecy, or direct actions beyond declared Safari automation?
Agent hijacking
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] Does the target skill's SKILL.md match the declared 1:1 parity description and avoid instructions beyond Safari automation or directives aimed at reviewers?
Agent hijacking
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What component or workflow does the line-238 claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (D247/D248, contradictions C422/C668/C669) actually describe, and does it cover the CLI tool-call path that cli_anything/safari/README.md documents as spawning a subprocess and navigating network URLs?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/safari_backend.py] How does the backend launch safari-mcp, and is the npm package version pinned (e.g. safari-mcp@2.7.8) or fetched unpinned/at latest when the README says the first tool call downloads it?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/security.py] Which URL schemes does the security layer block by default, and can CLI_ANYTHING_SAFARI_ALLOWED_SCHEMES re-enable dangerous schemes (file, javascript, data) that the README Security section claims are always blocked through both the tool group and the raw escape hatch?
Privilege escalation
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/safari_backend.py] How does backend.call invoke safari-mcp (does it pin a version such as 2.7.8, read environment credentials, or transmit data anywhere besides the local MCP stdio transport), and what does is_available probe on the npm registry?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/security.py] Does validate_url actually enforce the documented scheme blocklist (file, javascript, data, about, etc.) and the optional CLI_ANYTHING_SAFARI_BLOCK_PRIVATE private-network block, or can it be bypassed?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/tool_registry.py] Does load_registry read only the bundled resources/tools.json, or can it fetch or update the registry from a remote source at runtime?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/scripts/extract_tools.py] Does extract_tools.py only parse a locally installed safari-mcp index.js as documented, or does it fetch any code or instructions from the network?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/repl_skin.py] Does the remainder of repl_skin.py only render local styling and banner content (including the CLI_ANYTHING_SKILL_REPO env var and SKILL.md path detection), or does it read additional env/files or contact the network?
Reconnaissance
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/resources/tools.json] Do all 84 bundled tool schemas correspond to declared safari-mcp browser-automation tools, or does the registry contain extra or renamed tools (credential readers, shell execution, telemetry) that would poison the dynamically generated CLI surface?
Tool poisoning
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What component or path does the safety claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess' (D248, line 238) describe — the whole CLI, the bundled tool registry/--help path, or something else — and does the runtime availability check that runs 'npm view' fall under it?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/repl_skin.py] What value does _SKILL_SOURCE_REPO hold (used to build the banner install command 'npx skills add {_SKILL_SOURCE_REPO} --skill ... -g -y'), and is the referenced skill source pinned or mutable?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/README.md] What do the README around line 153 (claim D284) and the 'singleton killer' mention in extract_tools.py describe about how the CLI interacts with concurrently running safari-mcp instances — does it terminate, signal, or otherwise disrupt other agents' safari-mcp processes?
Destructive action
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What component or mode does 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' at line 238 describe, and does that claim govern the shotcut CLI's detached background process spawning in shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/shotcut_cli.py (_spawn_live_viewer lines 67-97, _spawn_live_poller lines 98-137)?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What does the safety claim at line 238, 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (D248), scope over — the whole agent-harness including the Shotcut CLI, or only a Safari-specific component — and is it accurate for whatever it scopes?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/README.md] What does the instruction at line 153 (D284) about not running 'this CLI' while another agent uses safari-mcp apply to, and is it a usage warning for the Safari CLI rather than a constraint the Shotcut code violates?
Code execution
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/shotcut_cli.py] What exactly do _spawn_live_poller and _spawn_live_viewer (called by preview live start) execute — which binary/command, with what arguments, detached or backgrounded — and do they touch anything beyond local preview session directories?
Code execution
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/core/media.py] Do generate_thumbnail, probe_media, and import_media invoke subprocesses, and to which local binaries (ffmpeg/ffprobe/melt); is any network access or file access outside the given media paths performed?
Code execution
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/core/preview.py] Do capture, latest, live_start, live_push, and run_live_poller execute external processes (melt/ffmpeg) or perform any network access or writes outside the preview bundle root directory?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] What component does the line-238 claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' (D248) scope to? Does it govern the shotcut module's e2e tests and melt backend that run ffmpeg/melt/shotcut-CLI subprocesses (i.e., are C638-C664 genuine claim breaks), or only the safari tool's own pure-logic components (cross-module mispairing)?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/README.md] For the line-153 rule 'Don't run this CLI while another agent (Claude Code, etc.) is actively using safari-mcp via MCP transport' (D284): what does 'this CLI' refer to, and could the shotcut CLI/ffmpeg/melt subprocesses in shotcut tests fall under this rule, or does it apply only to the safari CLI?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/HARNESS.md] Quote the context of the line-238 claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess' (D247/D248): which component does it describe, and does the SKILL.md's documented npx subprocess and network usage (e.g., the screenshot-decode pipeline example) actually contradict it, or does the claim only cover an offline subcomponent such as the bundled registry inspector?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/cli.py] Show where this package constructs the `npx safari-mcp` invocation: is the npm package version pinned (e.g., safari-mcp@<version>) or latest, and is there any integrity check against the bundled resources/tools.json before executing tools?
Supply chain
[file request cli_anything/safari/utils/safari_backend.py] What does safari_backend.call() spawn and forward — does it launch safari-mcp via npx with a pinned version (doc targets 2.7.8), and does it do anything beyond forwarding MCP tool calls such as extra network endpoints, file reads, or env access?
Supply chain
[file request cli_anything/safari/utils/security.py] Does the URL validation actually enforce the documented scheme blocklist (file, javascript, data, vbscript, about, chrome, safari, webkit, x-apple), is private-network blocking strictly opt-in via CLI_ANYTHING_SAFARI_BLOCK_PRIVATE=1, and does it send or log validated URLs anywhere off-host?
Code execution
[file request scripts/extract_tools.py] Does extract_tools.py only statically parse the installed safari-mcp index.js to regenerate tools.json, or does it execute the upstream code or fetch remote content during regeneration?
Supply chain
[file request blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/preview.py] What do run_live_poller, live_start, live_push, and capture do with their arguments, including the recorded 'command' strings and session_dir: do they make network requests, spawn additional processes, or execute the command strings, or do they only write local files under the session directory?
Code execution
[file request blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/core/render.py] Does render_scene or generate_bpy_script execute any subprocess (e.g. the blender binary) or write files outside the user-specified output path, or does it only generate and save the bpy script text?
Code execution
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari] Which files ship with the cli-anything-safari skill and what commands or scripts does it instruct the agent to run to install or launch the safari-mcp MCP server?
Code execution
[file request blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/utils/bpy_gen.py] Does generate_full_script escape or validate scene-derived strings (object/material/collection names, metadata, paths) interpolated into the generated bpy script, or can a crafted .blend-cli.json inject Python code that executes when Blender runs the script headless?
Code execution
[file request blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/core/blender_backend.py] How does render_scene_headless invoke Blender (shell string vs argument list), and can scene- or output-derived strings inject commands or arguments into that invocation?
Code execution
[file request blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/utils/bpy_gen.py] render_scene writes the script produced by generate_full_script and returns a 'blender --background --python' command for it; does generate_full_script emit anything beyond Blender scene construction and render calls, such as network access, subprocess/os.system/os.popen execution, credential or environment reads, or encoded payloads embedded in the generated script?
Code execution
[file request blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/blender_cli.py] The tests execute this CLI module via subprocess (resolved by _resolve_cli); does the CLI entry point perform any network access, credential or environment harvesting, or persistence writes beyond local scene file I/O?
Code execution
[file request blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/utils/bpy_gen.py] Do the remaining script generators (_gen_objects, _gen_cameras, _gen_lights, _gen_keyframes, _gen_render_output, _safe_var_name) interpolate scene-JSON values into the generated Python source without escaping, extending the injection surface into blender --python execution?
Code execution
[file request blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/preview.py] How does the live-preview poller run (background process or inline loop), where does it write session/trajectory state, and does it open any network connection?
Code execution
[file request browser/agent-harness/cli_anything/browser/domshell_backend.py] What exact npx command does the backend spawn for DOMShell (is the package version pinned), and do is_available and start_daemon execute code fetched from the registry at runtime?
Supply chain
[file request blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/utils/repl_skin.py] What repository does _SKILL_SOURCE_REPO reference and is it version-pinned or immutable?
Supply chain
[file request browser/agent-harness/cli_anything/browser/utils/domshell_backend.py] Show the module header and constants (DEFAULT_SERVER_CMD, _LANE_LINE, _ANSI_CSI_RE) and confirm or deny the presence of a 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess' claim; DEFAULT_SERVER_CMD determines what binary the MCP spawn executes (whether the unpinned npx package is launched on every call).
Code execution
[file request browser/agent-harness/pyproject.toml] SKILL.md instructs the agent to run 'pip install -e .' in browser/agent-harness; what entry points, console scripts, build backend, and install-time hooks does the package declare?
Code execution
[file request browser/agent-harness/cli_anything/browser/utils/repl_skin.py] What repository URL does the _SKILL_SOURCE_REPO constant used in the banner install command point to, and is it pinned to a commit or version?
Supply chain
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] Which MCP server does the shipped safari skill instruct agents to wrap (safari-mcp as declared vs @apireno/domshell as referenced by the harness code and mcp-backend guide), and does it instruct running any setup or install commands before use?
Supply chain
[file request cli-anything-plugin/repl_skin.py] What is the value of _SKILL_SOURCE_REPO used in the banner install command, and is skill_install_cmd ever executed by code rather than only displayed?
Supply chain
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/scripts/video_doctor.py] Do the audio/captions/frames/tail/sources/lint subcommands only invoke local media tools (ffmpeg/ffprobe) and write local report files, with no network access and no execution of non-tool commands?
Code execution
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/analytics.py] What exact fields does the analytics event payload collect (persistent ID, platform/OS, hostname, working directory, workspace paths?) and how is it sent to the posthog/umami endpoints?
Data exfiltration
[file request cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/scripts/video_doctor.py] Does the module header contain the claims 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess', and how are run/run_checked/run_bytes/run_ffprobe/ensure_tool implemented (any network access or shell=True)?
Code execution
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/analytics.py] What are the default analytics endpoint constants (POSTHOG_API_HOST, POSTHOG_PROJECT_TOKEN, UMAMI_URL, UMAMI_WEBSITE_ID, ANALYTICS_ID_FILE, USER_AGENT) and what does _is_enabled() default to (opt-in vs opt-out telemetry)?
Data exfiltration
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/matrix.py] What is the MATRIX_REGISTRY_URL value and the CACHE_TTL used for the remotely fetched matrix registry whose entries feed shell installs and rendered skills?
Supply chain
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/registry.py] Where do get_cli, fetch_all_clis, and search_clis obtain the CLI registry (network URL or local file), and can install_cmd/uninstall_cmd/update_cmd strings originate from a remote source that reaches _run_command shell=True?
Supply chain
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] Does the skill documentation disclose cli-hub's network telemetry and subprocess installs, and where is the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' made?
Data exfiltration
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/matrix.py] What does fetch_all_matrices fetch, from which URLs, and do fetched matrix entries include executable install hints or remote script paths?
Supply chain
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/registry.py] How are the fetched registry entries consumed, and is any entry field (entry_point, install_hint, skill_md) executed or only displayed?
Supply chain
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/cli.py] What value is passed to open_in_browser as target, and which command paths invoke matrix install, render_matrix_skill_file, or run registry-provided install commands?
Code execution
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] What instructions does the shipped skill give the agent (commands to run, network use, subprocess use), given the detected claims 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess' and 'No external dependencies'?
Code execution
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/registry.py] What are the concrete values of REGISTRY_URL, PUBLIC_REGISTRY_URL, and CACHE_FILE — which host serves the registries whose install_cmd values the installer executes?
Supply chain
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/installer.py] How do install_cli and _run_command execute registry-provided install_cmd in production — is shell=True used for pipes/&&, is any allowlist or sanitization applied before subprocess.run, and is user confirmation required before the curl|bash-style commands run?
Code execution
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/analytics.py] What exactly does _send_event transmit in production and to which endpoint — which payload fields (command, platform, agent context, parent-process data) are included, and is analytics enabled by default with only the CLI_HUB_NO_ANALYTICS opt-out?
Data exfiltration
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/cli.py] Where do track_visit, track_first_run, track_install, and track_uninstall send data (endpoint URL and payload), is telemetry disclosed or opt-out, and does the payload include command names and agent-detection results from detect_invocation_context?
Data exfiltration
[file request cli-hub/cli_hub/cli.py] What URL do fetch_all_clis and fetch_all_matrices fetch the CLI/matrix registry from, and are the installers referenced by the registry pinned or verified before install_cli runs them?
Supply chain
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] What commands, scripts, or install steps does the cli-anything-safari skill instruct the agent to run, and how is the safari-mcp MCP server installed and launched (any curl/sh, pip/npm install, or auto-run prerequisite)?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core/cam.py] The docstrings state G-code generation and export 'is performed by the generated FreeCAD macro' while generate_gcode/export_gcode only record metadata; where is that macro generated, what does it write or execute, and does it run without user confirmation?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core/freecad_backend.py] export_project passes generated macro content to freecad_backend.export_headless/run_macro: what exactly does this backend execute (FreeCAD invocation only, or shell/network/writes beyond the export path), completing or refuting the generate-macro-to-execute chain?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core/macro.py] Where is generate_macro defined and how are project values (including imported source_path strings recorded by import_file) interpolated into the generated FreeCAD macro — is anything escaped, or could stored values become executable macro code at export time?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core/freecad_backend.py] How does run_macro_content execute the generated FreeCAD macro (subprocess command construction, shell usage, environment handling), and does it perform any network access?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core/macro_gen.py] Do _safe_name and the _gen_header/_gen_parts/_gen_boolean_ops/_gen_bodies/_gen_placements/_render_spec_for_part helpers escape or sanitize part names and project data before they are interpolated into the macro that is subsequently executed?
Code execution
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] Does the cli-anything-safari skill ship or reference the freecad/agent-harness code, explaining why FreeCAD harness units appear under a Safari-automation target?
Impersonation
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core/macro_gen.py] Do _gen_header, _gen_parts, _gen_boolean_ops, _gen_bodies, and _gen_placements escape or safely quote project-derived strings (part names, labels, params, placements) that are interpolated into the generated FreeCAD macro which capture() executes via run_macro_content?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/backends/freecad_backend.py] How does run_macro_content execute the generated macro content (which binary or interpreter, how the command line is constructed, whether it writes the macro to a temp file, and what the timeout/env handling does)?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/core/techdraw.py] The TechDraw docstrings state PDF/SVG export is 'performed by the generated FreeCAD macro': where is that macro generated and executed, and can dynamic or untrusted content (paths, page names, annotation text) be embedded into the generated macro that later runs (EXEC)?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/freecad_cli.py] What do the cli-hub live preview watcher, the background FreeCAD live preview poller, and the motion showcase video renderer actually execute (which subprocesses/commands), and does 'publish the latest bundle' send data over a network (EXEC/EXFIL)?
Code execution
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] The target is declared as the cli-anything-safari skill (Safari automation via safari-mcp), but every unit served in this batch is FreeCAD harness code under freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/ — does this skill actually ship Safari wrapper files, and do any of its files reference the FreeCAD code shown here?
Impersonation
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/freecad_cli.py] Show the head of the file containing the truncated module docstring, reported to include the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.', plus the import lines, to confirm the exact claim wording and the modules (doc_mod, parts_mod, sketch_mod, body_mod, mat_mod, preview_mod, Session) the CLI imports.
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/freecad_cli.py] What do the helper functions _spawn_live_poller and _spawn_live_viewer execute (process construction, command strings, environment), and do they launch anything beyond the internal 'preview live monitor' poller or local viewer (network fetch, arbitrary command, download)?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/preview.py] Do preview_mod.live_start, preview_mod.run_live_poller, and preview_mod.capture execute shell commands, fetch remote content, or write files outside the preview bundle root directory?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/utils/freecad_backend.py] How do run_macro_content, run_macro, _macro_command, and _run construct and execute FreeCAD macro scripts and wrapper commands, and does any externally influenced or fetched content reach the executed script, its arguments, or the environment (EXEC)?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/utils/preview.py] How does preview capture build the macro script_content passed to run_macro_content (the tests fake a script containing artifact PNG output paths), and does any untrusted or fetched input flow into the generated script or its execution (EXEC)?
Code execution
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] What commands, install steps, or network/subprocess behavior does the Safari skill instruct the agent to perform, and does it contain the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.'?
Code execution
[file request skills/cli-anything-freecad/SKILL.md] Does the FreeCAD skill doc instruct running setup or installer scripts, or make claims (e.g. 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.') that the backend's subprocess execution and full-environment passing would contradict?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/document.py] Does open_document/save_document validate or numerically coerce part parameter values (length, radius, size, angle) when loading project JSON, which determines whether the macro-injection path from an untrusted project file is reachable?
Code execution
[file request freecad/agent-harness/cli_anything/freecad/utils/repl_skin.py] What remote repository or URL does the constant _SKILL_SOURCE_REPO used in skill_install_cmd point to, and is it version-pinned?
Supply chain
[file request openscreen/agent-harness/cli_anything/openscreen/core/ffmpeg_backend.py] How does ffmpeg_backend construct ffmpeg/ffprobe command lines (shell=True, string interpolation of user paths or editor settings) when called from probe, render_segment, concat_segments, and composite_on_background?
Code execution
[file request openscreen/agent-harness/cli_anything/openscreen/core/preview.py] Does preview_mod.capture execute the recorded `command` string (shell string vs argv list), could the user-supplied --recipe or root_dir values reach command construction, and do bundle/trajectory.json writes stay under the user-specified root directory without network access?
Code execution
[file request openscreen/agent-harness/cli_anything/openscreen/core/export.py] How does export_mod.render build its ffmpeg invocation (argv list vs shell string), do project JSON fields such as annotation text or the source video path reach the command, and does the render path make any network calls or write outside the requested output path?
Code execution
[file request openscreen/agent-harness/cli_anything/openscreen/utils/repl_skin.py] What is the value of _SKILL_SOURCE_REPO used in the banner install command, and is self.skill_install_cmd ever executed programmatically or only printed in the banner?
Supply chain
[file request openscreen/agent-harness/cli_anything/openscreen/skills/SKILL.md] Does the openscreen SKILL.md contain the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.', and does it instruct the agent to run any installations, fetches, or shell commands?
Code execution
[file request openscreen/agent-harness/cli_anything/openscreen/tests/test_full_e2e.py] How is self._run implemented (does it spawn subprocesses of the CLI), and does the file anywhere state the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.'?
Code execution
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] Does the cli-anything-safari skill ship, reference, or invoke the openscreen (ffmpeg video pipeline) or renderdoc (GPU capture) harnesses whose files appear in this batch, or are those files unrelated to the declared Safari automation purpose?
Code execution
[file request renderdoc/agent-harness/cli_anything/renderdoc/core/trajectory.py] Does append_live_trajectory only write trajectory.json locally under bundle_root, or does it publish/upload bundle manifests, capture paths, or project names off-host? Name the sink.
Data exfiltration
[file request renderdoc/agent-harness/cli_anything/renderdoc/core/bundles.py] Do prepare_bundle, finalize_bundle, bundle_root, artifact_record, and write_json confine all writes to a local bundle directory with no network transmission of artifact contents or paths?
Data exfiltration
[file request renderdoc/agent-harness/cli_anything/renderdoc/core/capture.py] Does CaptureHandle load the RenderDoc module and capture files locally only, or does it download, fetch, or execute any remote code when opening a capture?
Code execution
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] The skill is declared as Safari automation via safari-mcp but the shown units are RenderDoc GPU-debugging code; do the skill instructions chain into this renderdoc harness, and do any fenced commands download or execute code?
Code execution
[file request renderdoc/agent-harness/cli_anything/renderdoc/core/preview.py] Do preview.capture/diff/latest perform any network access, subprocess execution, or writes outside the bundle root computed by bundle_root()?
Data exfiltration
[file request renderdoc/agent-harness/cli_anything/renderdoc/core/pipeline.py] Do export_shader, export_shader_reflection, and dump_pipeline only write files under the export directory and never execute processes or transmit data off-host?
Code execution
[file request renderdoc/agent-harness/cli_anything/renderdoc/core/textures.py] Do save_texture and save_action_outputs write only to caller-supplied output paths with no network access or process execution?
Persistence
[file request renderdoc/agent-harness/cli_anything/renderdoc/core/capture.py] Does CaptureHandle open captures via the renderdoc python module only, or does it launch external binaries or network services when opening a capture?
Code execution
[file request renderdoc/agent-harness/cli_anything/renderdoc/utils/repl_skin.py] Does ReplSkin pass input lines through any shell, eval, or exec path beyond cli.main(args)?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/safari_backend.py] How is safari-mcp spawned: is the npm package version pinned (e.g. safari-mcp@x.y.z) or fetched unpinned via `npx -y safari-mcp`, and does the backend implement or rely on the singleton-killer/proxy behavior on port 9224?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/security.py] What does validate_url allow and block (schemes such as file:// or javascript:, localhost/link-local/metadata addresses), and can navigation or evaluate reach internal hosts?
Code execution
[file request renderdoc/agent-harness/cli_anything/renderdoc/utils/repl_skin.py] What is the value of _SKILL_SOURCE_REPO used in the banner's `npx skills add` install command, and is the installed skill content pinned to a commit or version?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/scripts/extract_tools.py] Does the offline extractor perform any network access, subprocess execution, or code evaluation, or is it a pure static parser of the given index.js file?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/safari_backend.py] What are the values of DEFAULT_SERVER_CMD and DEFAULT_SERVER_ARGS — is the npx-spawned safari-mcp package version-pinned (e.g. safari-mcp@2.7.8) or unpinned latest?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari/utils/repl_skin.py] What is the value of the _SKILL_SOURCE_REPO constant used in the banner install command 'npx skills add' — which remote repository does it point to and is it pinned?
Supply chain
[file request safari/agent-harness/scripts/extract_tools.py] Does scripts/extract_tools.py execute, eval, or import the safari-mcp index.js it is pointed at, or does it only parse the file statically to generate resources/tools.json?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/scripts/extract_tools.py] The documented regeneration step (SRC:fde17d8d6081ef83) executes this package-local script against the globally installed safari-mcp bundle and writes cli_anything/safari/resources/tools.json. Does extract_tools.py execute fetched or dynamically generated code, read credentials or secret-bearing environment variables, or write outside the package directory?
Code execution
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/cli.py] Where does the artifact actually spawn the live preview poller process, what exact argv does it run, and does it execute run_live_poller/record_live_poller_spawn in-process or via a subprocess, possibly using commands stored in session.json?
Code execution
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/core/bundles.py] Do prepare_bundle, finalize_bundle, artifact_record, find_latest_manifest, append_live_trajectory, load_live_trajectory, build_live_history_item, summarize_trajectory, and live_trajectory_path make any network requests or write files outside the preview/bundle directories?
Data exfiltration
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/shotcut_cli.py] Does the file anywhere contain the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.', and what do the portions not shown here (the 'preview live monitor' subcommand, media/export commands that invoke external tools, and the REPL loop) actually do - any network access, credential/environment access, or file writes outside project and session directories?
Code execution
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/core/preview.py] What does record_live_poller_spawn write and where, and does the preview/live-bundle module make any network requests or write outside the session directory for the detached poller spawned by _spawn_live_poller?
Code execution
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/shotcut_cli.py] Where are _spawn_live_poller and _spawn_live_viewer defined and what exact commands, binaries, and detach flags do they use to launch the hidden 'preview live monitor' poller and the cli-hub viewer?
Code execution
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/shotcut_cli.py] Does this file contain the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' reported by detector leads, at which lines, given that thumbnail/export paths invoke media_mod.generate_thumbnail and export_mod.render?
Code execution
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/utils/preview.py] Do preview_mod.capture, live_start, and run_live_poller execute external binaries (melt/ffmpeg) via subprocess, and where do they write bundle and session files?
Code execution
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/tests/test_full_e2e.py] How is the VIDEO constant produced in the module header — is it generated locally via ffmpeg, or could its creation involve any network fetch or download?
Code execution
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/SKILL.md] Locate the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' and determine whether the shipped skill or its test suite (ffmpeg subprocess.run, python -m CLI launches, melt rendering) contradicts it.
Code execution
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/utils/repl_skin.py] What is the value of the module-level constant _SKILL_SOURCE_REPO used to build the 'npx skills add ... -g -y' install command printed by the ReplSkin banner, and is that remote repository pinned by version, tag, or commit?
Supply chain
[file request shotcut/agent-harness/cli_anything/shotcut/tests/test_full_e2e.py] Does the module header or docstring of test_full_e2e.py contain the claim 'No Safari, no network, no subprocess.' cited by the contradiction detectors, indicating the Shotcut tests were copied from the Safari harness?
Code execution
[file request skills/cli-anything-safari/SKILL.md] Does the cli-anything-safari SKILL.md declare Safari-only behavior, and does it reference, install, or bundle the Shotcut code shown in this batch?
Impersonation
[file request safari/agent-harness/cli_anything/safari] How does the CLI obtain and launch safari-mcp on the first tool call: is the npm package version pinned, where is the downloaded package written, and is fetched code executed or spawned?
Code execution
[file request safari/agent-harness/scripts/extract_tools.py] Does scripts/extract_tools.py execute or evaluate the safari-mcp bundle passed as its first argument, or only parse it statically to write tools.json?
Code execution