MCP server

io.github.wismhero-maker/scrupp

mcp:wism-corp/scrupp-mcp-server

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Verdict

No issues found

No suspicious or malicious behavior was found.

Analyzed Oct 26, 2026, 13:46 UTC at af0f362

findings

—

highest severity

threat classes

files scanned

282/282

checks satisfied

package advisories

Why this verdict

plugin . No issues found

benign: 263 checks satisfied, no findings for plugin:.

skill skills/scrupp-prospecting No issues found

benign: 19 checks satisfied, no findings for skill:skills/scrupp-prospecting

Security findings 0

No security findings

No suspicious or malicious behavior was found; 2 candidate findings were refuted on review.

Refuted findings 2

Candidates the review stage examined and rejected, kept for transparency.

Supply chain

highRefutedlow confidence

The developer smoke-test script spawns the unpinned `scrupp-mcp-server@latest` from npm via `npx -y` and passes it the full process environment including SCRUPP_API_KEY, so a compromised latest release would receive the key; this is a dev-only script and the package is the project's own.

scripts/smoke-npm.mjs:15-16

["-y", "scrupp-mcp-server@latest"]

Why it was refuted

The script's header openly says it tests the project's own published package and is run manually by the user with their own key. Passing the env API key to the wrapped service's own MCP server is the expected carve-out, and nothing is concealed.

Credential access

highRefutedlow confidence

The client reads an undeclared SCRUPP_API_URL environment variable that overrides the API base URL, so the Bearer API key and request data would go to whatever host the env sets; the default is the official api.scrupp.com and the override is user-controlled, so this is likely an honest configuration option.

src/client.js:3

const BASE_URL = process.env.SCRUPP_API_URL ?? "https://api.scrupp.com/api/v1";

Why it was refuted

The code reads a user-controlled env var for the base URL and defaults to the official api.scrupp.com, which is a standard configuration override. No instruction or source-to-sink chain causes an attacker to set it, so this is not a credential-exfiltration behavior.