MCP server

Mundane

mcp:sttruji/mundane-mcp

Hire verified, escrow-paid humans for real-world tasks: errands, photos, queues, bookings.

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Verdict

Suspicious

Risky behavior the analysis could not rule out.

Analyzed Oct 26, 2026, 12:30 UTC at aa132a3

findings

high

highest severity

threat classes

files scanned

395/395

checks satisfied

package advisories

Why this verdict

mcp-server . Suspicious

suspicious: finding mcp-server:.:src/mcp_server/server.py:1227:EXFIL

plugin plugin No issues found

benign: 60 checks satisfied, no findings for plugin:plugin

skill plugin/skills/mundane No issues found

benign: 20 checks satisfied, no findings for skill:plugin/skills/mundane

Security findings 1

Data exfiltration

highContextual risklow confidence

attach_task_file reads an arbitrary agent-supplied local path and uploads it to the remote service, and the extension allowlist is checked against the overridable display filename rather than the real file, so any local file could be uploaded if the agent is induced to do so.

src/mcp_server/server.py:1227

upload_name = filename or os.path.basename(path)

vector:code

Counter-argument considered

The extension allowlist is checked against the overridable display name, not the real file. Passing filename='x.txt' lets any local file under 25 MB be uploaded, which contradicts the documented 'no archives or executables' restriction.

Refuted findings 2

Candidates the review stage examined and rejected, kept for transparency.

Data exfiltration

criticalRefutedlow confidence

attach_task_file reads a caller-chosen local file path and uploads its bytes to the Mundane API; this is the declared attachment feature, limited by an extension allowlist and size cap, but the agent could be steered to upload an arbitrary local txt/csv/pdf/image file.

src/mcp_server/server.py:1242-1243

content = handle.read()

Why it was refuted

Reading a local file and uploading it is the tool's declared core purpose (attach a working file from local disk), with an extension allowlist and size cap. Nothing is hidden or contradicted by this read/upload alone.

Supply chain

highRefutedlow confidence

The setup tells the agent or user to add and install a plugin from an unpinned GitHub marketplace (sttruji/mundane-mcp), although it says there is nothing to install; the code fetched is mutable and the publisher account is not verifiably the Mundane vendor.

plugin/skills/mundane/SKILL.md:40

claude plugin marketplace add sttruji/mundane-mcp

Why it was refuted

This is a vendor install instruction in a fenced setup block, for the Mundane plugin the skill itself belongs to. It is openly declared as installing the Mundane plugin, so it falls under the vendor-installer carve-out.